Editor's Desk
by Adam Avigan

While campaigning in Khan Yhunis—a militant hotbed located in the Gaza Strip which has seen several IDF incursions in recent (see Israelbrief)—recently elected Palestinian Chairman Mahmoud Abbas called Israel “the Zionist enemy,” and vowed never to take up arms against Palestinian militant groups.

While Abbas apologists might dismiss such comments as politically motivated and an attempt to muster support from extreme segments of Palestinian society, such comments from Abbas—a moderate who has openly condemned violence against Israeli civilians—are disappointing.

His vow signifies the current weakness of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Abbas’ inability and or unwillingness to confront Palestinian terrorist groups, which the US “Roadmap for Peace” labels as a prerequisite to the beginning of peace negotiations.

To be fair, Abbas is in a difficult political position. Four years of Intifada have paradoxically created deep political schisms among Palestinian factions, culminating in an armed confrontation between Fatah’s “Young” and “Old” guards in Gaza since July 2004. The PA’s legitimacy in the public’s eye is waning because of rampant political corruption and as a result, people have turned to militant groups like Hamas to fill the political void.

In a popular opinion poll taken by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank, support for Hamas rose from 17% in mid-2000 before the Intifada to 35% in mid-2004. By contrast, Fatah’s popularity dropped from 37% to 28% during the same period of time.

Hamas showed its waxing popularity on Dec. 23 in the local municipal elections in 26 towns in the West Bank, in which it won seven local councils including many areas traditionally considered to be Fatah strong holds.

In contrast, Fatah won majorities in 12 municipalities. In another poll taken by the same organization, 87% of Palestinians interviewed believed that there was corruption within the PA, while 92% backed internal reform within the PA at the highest level.

As chairman of the PA, Abbas must strengthen its ability to provide domestic security for both Palestinians and Israelis. This means appeasing militant organizations like Hamas and Fatah’s Young Guard who will surely play a strong role in future Palestinian affairs and suppressing, by force if necessary, their violent inclination to harm Israelis.

Although tensions run high, all parties agree that a Palestinian civil war would be disastrous to any hope of establishing an autonomous state and will be more flexible to making concessions for the sake of Palestinian unity.

Balancing these factions will be tough; however Abbas is the most qualified candidate to oversee a post-Arafat period of transition. Although some criticize his lack of charisma, almost all parties to the conflict find him acceptable. Although associated with Fatah’s Old Guard, Young Guard leaders respect him because of his genuine support for governmental, economic and security reforms. During his tenure as the first Palestinian Prime Minister—beginning in March 2003 and ending with his resignation the following Sept., Abbas made serious attempts at reform, however failed because then Palestinian Chairman Arafat found ways to strip him of his constitutional powers.

Abbas’ first step in strengthening the PA is to fulfill his promise of holding Palestinian parliamentary elections within the next couple of months. Elections would restore popular belief that the government is a true representation of the populace, giving it more freedom to institute unpopular actions. People who supported armed groups because of the rampant corruption will be able to restore their confidence in the government.

Elections would also allow Fatah’s Young Guard and other militant groups who gained popularity during the Intifada to transfer their popularity into political power through democratic and not violent means.

Although Hamas and other Islamists might choose to boycott the parliamentary elections because of the prospect of making peace with Israel, they also have a lot to gain. If they decide to take part in the elections, popular support that they gained during the Intifada will translate to significant political power in Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), from which they have been excluded to their detriment since their last boycott of the parliamentary elections.

On the other hand, once Hamas joins the government in any form, they will invariably lose a level of the autonomy which they enjoyed as an independent organization. They will be forced to follow the majority ruling of the PLC no matter if they agree with it or not, even if it includes the passing of a peace treaty with the “Zionist enemy.” Any dissention would undermine the centrality of the PA and necessarily prompt significant pressure to do otherwise and might force a long delayed confrontation between Palestinian security forces and armed militants.

Abbas does not have to make Palestinians love Israelis; however, he must strengthen the PA to the extent that it can control its own population without fear of violent dissent. This means stopping its campaign of popular incitement against Israel in the government controlled media.

Although politically productive in the short-term, such demands will limit Abbas’ bargaining power in the future and create civil unrest when he cannot follow through on his artificially high promises. Such talk undermines his credibility with Israel and the international communities, making him appear as though he is waging a proxy war against Israel through Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups.

Calling Israel “The Zionist enemy,” might have short term benefits, but in the long term, it will undermine Abbas’ credibility at home, in the region and in the international world.